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This Article examines some of the more recent problems involving Canadian-Unites States
trade, and proposes a legal framework within which to formulate a comprehensive trade and in-
vestment agreement.
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Canada and the United States are each other's largest
commercial partners. Bilateral trade between the two coun-
tries, which amounted to well over 110 billion dollars worth of
goods and services in 1984, is greater than the United States'
combined bilateral trade with both Japan and the European
Community.' Furthermore, they are each other's greatest
source of foreign investment. The United States has over 52
billion dollars invested in Canada, 2 while Canada has approxi-
mately 9 billion dollars in direct and portfolio investment in
the United States.3
As a result of these trade and investment activities, the
economic and fiscal policies of each country have a strong ef-
fect in the other.4 Despite this, Canada and the United States
have not entered into a legally enforceable, comprehensive, in-
vestment or trade agreement. This has left both sides virtually
powerless to take remedial action in the face of growing trade
and investment disputes. This Article examines some of the
more recent problems involving Canadian-United States trade,
and proposes a legal framework within which to formulate a
comprehensive trade and investment agreement.
* Legal consultant, Advokatfirman Carlers, Stockholm, Sweden. J.D., 1984,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law; A.B., 1981, State University of New
York at Albany.
1. Address by Thomas d'Aquino, President of the Business Council on National
Issues, International Business Council MidAmerica (Feb. 8, 1984).
2. Boyd, Canada-United States Transnational Business Activities: Current Tax and Other
Developments -" Introductory Remarks, 4 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 90, 90 (1981).
3. Id.
4. Id.
162 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:161
I. EXISTING BARRIERS TO THE FLOW OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES
Both Canada and the United States have expressed seri-
ous concern over each others' growing protectionist actions re-
garding trade and investment. Recently, disputes have arisen
over such areas as nontariff trade barriers and restrictive in-
vestment practices. The following is a survey of current trade
and investment problems.
A. United States Concerns
1. Investment Barriers
The United States is particularly concerned about Can-
ada's efforts to gain greater Canadian equity ownership and to
ensure that significant manufacturing operations take place in
Canada. 5  Two areas which have been a particular source of
irritation to the United States are the Foreign Investment Re-
view Agency6 (FIRA) and the National Energy Plan7 (NEP).8
Under the Foreign Investment Review Act9 (Act), those
5. King, The Changing Context for the Foreign Investor in Canada: Introductory Remarks,
in SYMPOSIUM: PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 235, 238
(1982).
6. The Foreign Investment Review Agency was established by the Foreign In-
vestment Review Act, ch. 46, § 7, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619. It became effective in
1974 with respect to acquisition of Canadian companies, and in 1975 with respect to
new investments. Macdonald, Canadian Industrial Policy Objectives and Article III of
GATT National Ambitions and International Obligations, 6 CAN. Bus. L.J. 385, 393-94
(1982).
7. CAN. DEP'T OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PRO-
GRAM 1980 (Report No. EP80/4E) (1981). The National Energy Program is
an energy package that includes pricing regimes, fiscal measures, expendi-
ture programs, and direct federal action to achieve the goals of energy se-
curity, opportunity and fairness. The specific elements of the National En-
ergy Program . . . will re-structure Canada's energy system to balance do-
mestic oil supplies with domestic demand by 1990, achieve an equitable
sharing of energy benefits and burdens among Canadians, lead to a high
level of Canadian ownership and control of the energy sector, expand the
role of the public sector in oil and gas, and ensure greater industrial benefits
from energy development.
Id.
8. King, supra note 5, at 239.
9. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619. The Act
provides for the "review and assessment of acquisitions of control of Canadian busi-
ness enterprises by certain persons and of the establishment of new businesses in
Canada by certain persons." Id. preamble.
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who are not citizens or permanent residents of Canada, and
corporations controlled directly or indirectly by such per-
sons,' 0 must apply to FIRA for permission to acquire control
over a Canadian enterprise, or to make a new investment in
Canada in an area where such investment is unrelated to that
previously carried out by such person in Canada." The gen-
eral criterion for allowing a takeover or investment is that it be
of significant benefit to Canada.' 2 FIRA's decisions also con-
sider these specific criteria: 1) the effect of the acquisition;' 3
2) the nature and level of the applicant's economic activity in
Canada;' 4 3) whether there is significant Canadian participa-
tion in the business;' 5 4) the effect of the acquisition on indus-
trial efficiency, productivity,' 6 and competition in Canada;' 7
and, 5) whether the business is compatible with enunciated
policy objectives of all levels of government.'
FIRA has, in practice, often negotiated with the applicant
"to win" specific "pro-Canada" employment of Canadian citi-
zens,' 9 use of Canadian goods and services, 20 and greater Ca-
nadian equity participation. 2' Because nonapprovals some-
times result for political reasons,22 FIRA is viewed by the
10. For a definitional discussion of the entities affected, see Scace, US. Invest-
ment in Canada: The Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) and Provincial Incentives, 4 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 100, 100-01 (1981).
11. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, §§ 8-13, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619;
see Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394.
12. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, § 2, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619; see
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394; Scace, supra note 10, at 101.
13. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, § 2(a), 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619; see
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394; Scace, supra note 10, at 101.
14. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, § 2(a), 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619; see
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394; Scace, supra note 10, at 101.
15. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, § 2(b), 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619; see
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394; Scace, supra note 10, at 101.
16. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, § 2(c), 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619; see
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394; Scace, supra note 10, at 101.
17. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, § 2(d), 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619; see
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394; Scace, supra note 10, at 101.
18. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, § 2(e), 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619; see
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 394; Scace, supra note 10, at 101.
19. Macdonald, supra note 6, at 395.
20. Id. A General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) tribunal recently
held that Canada's legal sourcing requirements are inconsistent with GATT national
treatment principles. Decison of GATT Panel on Canada's Adminstration of the For-
eign Investment Review Act, L/5504 (1984).
21. Macdonald, supra note 6, at 395.
22. See Rugman, Canada: FIRA Update, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 352, 354-55
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United States Government and by the United States financial
and business community as a substantial barrier to foreign di-
rect investment in Canada. 2' The number of unsuccessful
FIRA applicants doubled from 14% in 1978 to 29% in 1981.24
Although the current approval rate is roughly 95%,25 there is
no guarantee that approvals will continue. 26 This causes Can-
ada to be a costly and unattractive investment environment for
multinational enterprises. 7
"Canadianization" is also the rationale behind the Na-
tional Energy Plan. The creation of the NEP resulted from the
Canadian Government's belief that foreign energy firms, which
controlled 62.7% of the oil and gas sector and 38.3% of min-
ing, 28 were not reinvesting enough of their profits from Cana-
dian energy production into energy development. 9 With the
NEP, Canada hopes to direct energy profits into the develop-
ment of Canadian businesses and natural resources and to en-
sure its future energy self-sufficiency. 30 The program requires
foreign firms to be at least 50% Canadian owned and calls for
at least 50% Canadian ownership of oil and gas production by
1990.31 It also includes a retroactively applied "back-in" pro-
vision, which gives 25% of oil and gas discoveries in Canadian
(1983). The implication is that "FIRA can turn from a paper tiger to an angry Cana-
dian bear, depending on the political views of the government and minister responsi-
ble." Id. at 352.
23. Id. at 354.
24. See id. at 353. FIRA approved 87% of new business investments in 1978, but
only 71% in 1981. Id.
25. Interview with G.H. Dewhirst, Director General of the Foreign Investment
Review Agency, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
26. See Rugman, supra note 22, at 354. The FIRA has been marked with uncer-
tainty, and if it continues "to bend with the political winds it may eventually blow
away foreign investment altogether. . . . The very uncertainty surrounding FIRA
makes it a substantial barrier to foreign direct investment." Id.
27. Id. at 354-55. A multinational enterprise has been defined as "the embodi-
ment of foreign direct investment by a single business enterprise which straddles
several economies (a minimum for four or five) and divides its global activities be-
tween different countries with a view to realizing over-all corporate objectives."
GOV'T OF CAN., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA 51 (1972).
28. King, supra note 5, at 238. The figures quoted are in terms of assets. Id. n.2.
29. Id. at 237.
30. Id.
31. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, § 19, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. 2655; see La-
casse, Legal Issues Relating to the Canadian National Energy Program, 16 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 301, 305, 334 (1983).
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lands to a government-owned corporation.3 2 Canadian firms
are given preference when applying for production licenses
and exploration incentive grants.
The United States takes the position that the NEP, by dis-
criminating against United States owned or controlled inter-
ests, conflicts with the principle of national treatment 34 ex-
pressed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 5
(GAIT) and the Organization for Economic Control and De-
velopment Guidelines on International Investment and Mul-
tinational Enterprises36 (OECD Guidelines). Furthermore, the
United States believes that the 25% retroactively applied
"back-in" provision is expropriatory in nature. 7 It rejects the
payments made to United States interests to compensate for
the "back-in" arrangement because such payments may not
"take full account of the true commercial assets involved." '38
32. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, § 19, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. 2655; see King,
supra note 5, at 237.
33. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, § 27, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. 2655; see La.
casse, supra note 31, at 332.
34. Lacasse, supra note 31, at 335 (citing Letter from William E. Brock, United
States Trade Representative, to Herb Gray, Canadian Industry Minister (Mar. 11,
1981)). The United States views the NEP as unjust discrimination, even taking into
account the Canadian interpretive statement on national treatment at the time of
1976 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development declaration on na-
tional treatment. Id. at 336.
35. Openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. GATT is the principal forum through which the
over 80 signatories work to "reduce tariffs, eliminate nontariff measures, and remove
other trade obstacles." 4 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE iii
(The Tokyo Round Agreements Sept. 1981). The GATT provision on national treat-
ment provides that "the products ...of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favour-
able than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regu-
lations and requirements affecting their internal sale .. .purchase . . .or use."
GATT, supra, art. 111(2).
36. Org. of Econ. Cooperation and Dev., International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises (1976) [hereinafter cited as OECD Guidelines]. These guidelines
provide:
that member countries should, consistent with their needs to maintain pub-
lic order, to protect their essential security interests and to fulfill commit-
ments relating to international peace and security, accord to . . .[Foreign
Controlled Enterprises] treatment under their laws . . . consistent with in-
ternational law and no less favourable than that accorded in like situations
to domestic enterprises.
Id. art. 2(1).
37. Lacasse, supra note 31, 346-48.
38. Id. at 346 (quoting Letter from William E. Brock, United States Trade Rep-
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2. Trade Barriers
Canadian trade policy is another cause for concern in the
United States. 39 The United States objects to Canada's pro-
posed import policy, which would add to existing Canadian an-
tidumping legislation a "basic price" system for use in com-
plex and emergency situations.4" This system would be more
restrictive than current United States antidumping legisla-
tion.4' The United States Government fears that, as a result,
internal pressures will mount to make United States antidump-
ing legislation more protectionist.4 2
A closely related issue is the proposed antidumping and
countervail systems. These proposals, according to one au-
thor, fail to meet the Tokyo Round43 requirements because the
impact of dumping or subsidization on domestic producers is
not regarded simultaneously.44 The United States believes
Canada should adopt a technique similar to its own prelimi-
nary pricing system, which would tend to make Canada's an-
tidumping and countervail systems less threatening.45
Still another area of concern to the United States is trade
in services.4 6 A good example of this is the border broadcast-
ing dispute, which began in 1976 when Canada eliminated tax
deductions for approximately Can.$15 million in advertising
costs spent by Canadian firms for broadcast time on United
States radio stations.47 Attempts in Congress to retaliate
resentative, to Peter M. Towe, Canadian Ambassador to the United States (June 1,
1981)).
39. R. GREY, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's: AN AGENDA FOR CANADIAN-U.S. RE-
LATIONS 68 (1981).
40. Id. at 72.
41. Id. The Canadian "basic price" system would be more restrictive than the
United States "trigger price" system in that under the United States system "sale at
less than the trigger price may trigger an anti-dumping investigation but not the au-
tomatic levying of an anti-dumping duty." Id.
42. Id.
43. Tokyo Round refers to the most recent multilateral trade negotiations con-
ducted pursuant to GATT, which were held in Geneva from 1973 to 1979. See gener-
ally Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 153 (1979).
44. R. GREY, supra note 39, at 73-74.
45. Id. at 74.
46. Id. at 74-75.
47. Westell, Poison Pinpricks, Foreign Pol'y, Winter 1980-1981, at 101; see Mor-
rissy, Industrial Policies of North American and Their Implications for U.S Trade and Invest-
ment Relations, 7 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 331, 345 (1982).
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against Canada have been unsuccessful. 48 Other Canadian re-
strictions of trade in service are likely to receive increased at-
tention in the United States. These include banking, insur-
ance, engineering consulting, data processing, air transport,
and marine transport.49
Finally, the United States would like to see liberalization
of Canadian Government procurement regulations. 50 The
Canadian Treasury Board ensures that "government
purchases for goods and services over $2 million and construc-
tion over $10 million meet government objectives."'"
Although Canada is a signatory to the GATT procurement
code,5 2 significant areas of purchasing by federal, provincial,
and local government and Crown Corporations are not cov-
ered by the code.53
B. Canadian Concerns
1. Investment Barriers
In a recent report, Canada's Foreign Investment Review
Agency stated that, contrary to assertions made by the United
States, foreign investment is in fact controlled by the United
States. 54  Foreign investment in power production, for exam-
48. See Morrissy, supra note 47, at 345. These failed attempts "illustrate how
difficult it is to define and impose appropriate retaliation, especially cross-product
retaliation. Often an industry is reluctant to accept, at some cost to itself, trade re-
strictions that are designed as a mode of retaliation to benefit another sector." Id.
49. R. GREY, supra note 39, at 74.




54. FOREIGN INV. REV. AGENCY, BARRIERS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 71 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS]. The
report stated, in pertinent part:
The United States Government, like any other, has on a number of occa-
sions passed legislation to control foreign investment in order to protect its
own interests. Statements on the open nature of the American economy are
simply not borne out of American practice. What we find in place of a visi-
ble regulatory authority is a web of laws, regulations, public hearings, pro-
grams and ordinances, at both the state and federal level, which can effec-
tively prevent, or at least delay, a foreign investment transaction at the dis-
cretion of almost anyone with the knowledge and resources to selectively
apply the procedures.
Id. at 2. It further asserts that "[s]teps have been taken to prohibit or restrict foreign
investment in many areas including shipping, aviation, aeronautics, communications,
nuclear and hydroelectric power, banking, insurance, real estate, mining, maritime
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ple, is virtually prohibited in the United States. Under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 51 aliens, foreign governments, for-
eign corporations, or foreign-controlled enterprises cannot be
issued licenses for the operation of atomic energy utilization-
of-production facilities in the United States. 56 In addition,
licenses for hydroelectric facilities are not available to foreign-
controlled enterprises, 57 and leases for the development of ge-
othermal steam and associated resources may be issued only to
United States citizens and corporations organized under fed-
eral or state law.58 In addition,
foreign-controlled enterprises may not acquire rights of way
for oil pipelines, or acquire any interest therein, or acquire
leases or interests therein for mining coal, oil, or certain
other minerals, on federal lands other than the outer conti-
nental shelf. However, a foreign-controlled corporation
may hold such an interest if its home country grants recip-
rocal rights to U.S. corporations .... 59
This reciprocity provision was applied to Royal Dutch Shell, a
Netherlands corporation in the 1920's, and to the United
Kingdom with regard to coal when it nationalized its coal in-
dustry in 1948.60 Recently, the United States Department of
Interior reviewed Canada's reciprocal status under the Act.61
After months of delay, then Secretary of the Interior James
Watt declared that Canada was still a reciprocal country in that
activities, and defense (which itself covers many areas). Special measures are applied
to foreign-controlled companies." Id. at 71. The report adds that "the absence of
clear authority and well-defined restrictions leaves the system open to abuse. Deci-
sions by regulatory agencies frequently appear arbitrary and unfair. Pressure from
interest groups can lead to 'adjusted' interpretations of the law." Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976).
56. Id. § 2133(d); see FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 8.
57. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1976); see FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRI-
ERS, supra note 54, at 8.
58. Geothermal Steam Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); see FOREIGN INVESTMENT
BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 9.
59. FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 11. This prohibition is
codified by the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
60. See The Adequacy of the Federal Response to Foreign Investment in the United States,
Twentieth Report by the Committeee on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 137
(1980); FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 11.
61. FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 12. "It has been made
public that Canada could be declared wholly or partly non-reciprocal, in which case
Canadian firms could be banned wholly or partly from mineral leases on U.S. federal
lands." Id.
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its laws and regulations do not deny Americans "the privilege
of stock ownership in corporations which have an interest in
Canadian mineral resources. 62
The United States also controls foreign investment indi-
rectly through selective application of securities, antitrust and
defense laws, congressional lobbying and hearings, and gov-
ernmental monitoring and review.63 One agency in particular
is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
64
(CFIUS), whose primary responsibility is to monitor the impact
of, and coordinate United States policy on, foreign investment
in the United States.65 Its functions include reviewing "invest-
ments in the United States which, in the judgment of CFIUS,
might have major implications for United States national inter-
est."'6 6 Upon a finding that an investment would have major
implications for the national interest, the chairman contacts
the Economic Policy Group and the National Security Council,
requesting their concurrence in notifying the foreign govern-
ment involved. 67 They, in turn, make a request to that govern-
ment to either refrain or modify the investment so that it is
acceptable to the United States Government. 68  Although
CFIUS does not have the legal power to block investments, it is
confident that diplomatic representation would suffice in the
case of investments by foreign governments or by a private for-
eign investor.69
Recent activities of CFIUS demonstrate its restrictive prac-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 71.
64. Id. at 56. Created by an Executive Order on May 7, 1975, the committee is
chaired by the Treasury Department and includes representatives of the Departments
of State, Defense, and Commerce, the Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive, and the Council of Economic Advisors. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990
(1975). It has the primary responsibility for monitoring the impact of, and coordinat-
ing policy for, foreign investment in the United States. See FOREIGN INVESTMENT BAR-
RIERS, supra note 54, at 56.
65. FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 56.
66. Id. at 57. It also has the function of providing "guidance on arrangements
with foreign governments for advance consultations on prospective major foreign
governmental investments in the United States .... Id. at 56.
67. Id. at 58.
68. Id.
69. Id. The committee has stated that it is unlikely that a foreign government
would persist in investing in the United States over the strong objections of the
United States Government. Even if it were insensitive to the implications of such
actions, the fear of retaliation would be preventive. Id.
1985]
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tices. For instance, CFIUS requested a deferral of the pro-
posed acquisition and transfer of Texasgulf's Canadian assets
to the Canadian Development Corporation, a Crown Corpora-
tion, on the ground that it would have an adverse effect on the
availability of sulphur and phosphate fertilizers in the United
States.70 In July, 1981, CFIUS asked French-owned Soci&t6
Nationale Elf Aquitine to hold back on its merger with Texas-
gulf in order to give the committee time to assess the implica-
tions of the proposed merger. 71 The committee has also
looked at actions leading to the acquisition of 25,000 shares of
Conoco by the Montreal-based Seagram Co., 72 as well as sev-
eral dealings involving the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, a
proposed joint-venture with Pacific Resources and AZL Re-
sources, and a proposed merger with Santa Fe International.73
There are indications that CFIUS' role in reviewing for-
eign investment will become greater. Congress has criticized
CFIUS as being "seriously deficient" in protecting United
States national interests74 and thus may want to extend its au-
thority and increase its powers. There are also indications that
the Reagan Administration is willing to respond to the possible
dangers of foreign investment, particularly investments made
by alien governments that are not consistent with the energy
independence goals of the United States.75
In summarizing barriers to foreign investment in the
United States, a FIRA report stated that the foreign investor
"encounters not a single central agency, but a highly diffuse
set of laws and regulations which may leave him confused and
perhaps suspicious that the very ambiguity of his situation is
no accident." 7
6
70. Id. at 61 (quoting U.S. vs. Canada: Ominous Developments for Foreign Investors,
Bus. Int'l, July 24, 1981, at 237).
71. FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 60 (quoting Elf Wraps up
Deal of Texasgulf, The Gazette (Montreal) July 20, 1981, at 49).
72. FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 60 (quoting King, Tougher
Line is Sought in U.S. to Monitor Foreign Investment, Globe and Mail, Aug. 10, 1981, at 12.
73. FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 61 (quoting Federal Response
to OPEC Country Investments in the United States: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 97 Cong., 1st Sess. 258-60 (1981)).
74. See FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS, supra note 54, at 59.
75. Id. at 60.
76. Id. at 71.
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2. Trade Barriers
The United States Congress, in response to organized la-
bor's concerns about increasing unemployment, business-
men's frustrations over "unfair" trade practices of major trad-
ing partners, and the general unease of the United States pub-
lic, is moving increasingly towards protectionist trade
policies. 7 7  Unfortunately, Canada is often inadvertently af-
fected by United States legislation aimed at other countries.78
A fear that this may debilitate the Canadian economy has led to
rising Canadian concern over United States nontariff barriers
in several areas, including countervailing duties, procurement,
and United States safeguard actions applied inadvertently
against Canadian exports. 7
9
a. Countervailing duties
With respect to countervailing duties, the GATT agree-
ment fails to meet Canada's needs regarding its trade relations
with the United States.8 0 For example, the Canadian govern-
ment has noted that "although the U. S. government [under
GATT] must now establish injury before imposing countervail
duties, the new U.S. procedure makes it easier for U.S. compa-
nies to lodge complaints and for the authorities to find
'injury.' t81
The GATT agreement, furthermore, does not always clar-
ify what constitutes a subsidy for countervail purposes.8 2
Should the United States vigorously apply its countervail sys-
tem, it could have a greater impact on the effectiveness of Ca-
77. Address by Allan E. Gotlieb, Canadian Ambassador to the United States,
C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (Apr. 15, 1983).
78. Id. "In many cases, the object of U.S. frustration is not Canada at all, but [it]
often [gets] hit by legislation aimed at other trading partners." Id.
79. STANDING SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF., CANADA-UNITED STATES RELA-
TIONS, vol. 3, CANADA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 11-12 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as STANDING COMMITrEE REPORT]. "In the context of Canada-U.S.
trade, as distinct from multilateral trade, the impact of non-tariff barriers is increas-
ing both relatively and absolutely. This reflects both the diminishing importance of
tariffs and the growing recourse to non-tariff barriers as a form of protection." Id. at
11.
80. See id. at 12.
81. Id. A bill before Congress would make it even easier for all industries to file
countervailing duty suits. Westell, U.S. Trade Lobbies Fed by Opportunism, Globe and
Mail, Jan. 28, 1984, at BI, col. 1.
82. Standing Committeeee Report, supra note 79, at 12.
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nadian industrial development policies than would any parallel
countervail action that Canada could take against the United
States.83
b. Procurement
Procurement, including products purchased by govern-
ments and their agencies, is the most pressing nontariff barrier
problem between Canada and the United States. 4 Without a
domestic mass market base, the survival of Canadian industries
such as telecommunications equipment, electricity generating
and transmitting equipment, urban mass transit equipment,
aircraft and aircraft parts and avionics, depends on sales to for-
eign procurement markets in the United States. 85 The difficulty
is that not only does the GATT procurement code not apply to
these areas, but that there is a marked increase in United States
procurement protection by Congress and at the state level.8 6
Of the fifty states, thirty-seven have adopted "Buy American"
restrictions87 to several federal appropriations laws such as the
Public Works Employment Act 8 and the Clean Water Act.8 9
These legislative actions have hurt some Canadian producers
badly. In one case, for example, steel bridge exports to New
York State alone fell from Can.$20 million in 1978 to Can.$1
million in 1979.90
83. Id. The report states that:
This is because such a relatively large percentage of Canadian production is
exported while in the United States the major portion of production is for
the internal market. Any subsidization of Canadian industry could be seen
as involving an encouragement of production for export purposes and
would accordingly run the risk of U.S. countervail. By contrast, sub-
sidizaiton of a firm in the United States would be directed mainly toward
encouraging production for the U.S. domestic market and would only in-
volve the risk of Canadian countervail for the very small percent of products
which it might export.
Id.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. These restrictions require that 50% of the content be American and final
assembly take place in the United States. Id.
88. 40 U.S.C. § 270a (Supp. IV 1980).
89. 33 U.S.C § 1251 (1976).
90. STANDING COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 13. As a result, the com-
pany "decided it had no alternative but to establish facilities within the United States
if it wanted to circumvent state Buy American barriers to municipal markets." Id. at
14. A car manufacturer, in another case, warned if the 50% requirement for basic
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c. United States Safeguard Actions
Canadian exports are also vulnerable to United States
safeguard or emergency actions. 9' In times of economic down-
turn, business persons are likely to seek protection from emer-
gency import action. 2 In January, 1984, Canada's daily na-
tional newspaper reported that several United States industries
recently launched initiatives to reduce imports in such areas as
fish processors, copper and steel producers, and manufactur-
ers of autos, footware and flatware. 93 It is believed that the
wine, canned tuna, uranium, and machine tool industries are
likely to urge protectionist moves as well.94
To comply with GATT, however, safeguard measures such
as tariffs or quotas must not be discriminatory or single out
imports from a particular country: They must apply to imports
across the board.95 As a result, Canadian imports may suffer if
the United States takes action against intolerable imports from
96other countries.
C. Summary
Both Canada and the United States are greatly concerned
about each other's trade and investment policies. The nega-
tive consequences of such policies appear to be greater for
Canada, as evidenced by its shrinking share of world trade in
manufactured goods as well as its declining trade performance
with the United States.97 Furthermore, the current uncertainty
surrounding Canada's FIRA may force multinational enter-
prises to seek more secure investment environments else-
United States content were to be raised to 75%, "it would lead to complete manufac-
ture of his company's urban transport cars in the United States." Id.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id.
93. Westell, U.S. Trade Lobbies Fed by Opportunism, Globe and Mail, Jan. 28, 1984,
at BI, col. 1.
94. Id.
95. LeMay, Bilateral Pact Aids Canada's Viewpoint, Globe and Mail, Feb. 27, 1984,
at BI, col. 1.
96. STANDING COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 16. "Examples of past U.S.
punitive action hitting Canada inadvertantly are U.S. safeguard measures against spe-
cialty steel and fasteners in 1974 and 1978." Id.
97. Id. at 18. The Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, for
example, fears Canada is in danger of being pushed out of world markets altogether.
Id.
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where. 98 The NEP, with its provisions for "Canadianization"
of the oil and gas industries, has provoked a massive with-
drawal of United States investment capital, thereby vastly in-
creasing Canada's dependence on new sources of foreign
funds.9 9 The Canadian Government is also concerned that its
industrial policies will cause Canada to become a target for ad-
ditional retaliatory measures from the United States Govern-
ment and influential segments of the private business sector. ' 00
Because United States domestic production is primarily
for its own huge internal market, the consequences for the
United States are not quite so apparent.' 0 ' The following sec-
tion examines the effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral
agreements used by Canada and the United States to conduct
trade and investment relations.
II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT MULTILATERAL
AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
A. Multilateral Agreements
At the multilateral level, both Canada and the United
States are signatories of the GATT'12 and OECD declara-
tions. 0 3 Each of these instruments has its limitations.
GATT, for example, is aimed almost exclusively at reduc-
ing or eliminating import tariffs and has limited application to
nontariff barriers. 0 4 It is not a comprehensive free trade
agreement.t°5 Free trade, if it occurs at all, may not be fully
98. Rugman, supra note 22, at 354. "Multinational enterprises have the flexibil-
ity to go elsewhere when the costs of investing in one host nation become too high,
as when there are changes in environmental parameters, such as FIRA." Id.
99. Beigie & Stewart, New Pressures, Old Constraints: Canada-United States Relations
in the 1980s, in 40 BEHIND THE HEADLINES No. 6, at 17 (1983).
100. STANDING CoMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 20. "Bilateral trade con-
frontations seem bound to increase and Congress, in particular, may retaliate in quite
unrelated areas as it has done in the past. The Canadian economy could end up in a
very much worse situation than would have occurred without some of these Canadian
government's industrial development measures." Id.
101. Id. at 12.
102. GATT, supra note 35, preamble.
103. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888
U.N.T.S. 179.
104. GATT, supra note 35, arts. 11(2), 111(l).
105. See id. art. II. For example, GATT allows states to maintain current prefer-
ential policies and establish countervailing duties. See id.
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realized until the 1990's.'0 6 Another difficulty is that GATT is
strictly limited to commercial policy; it does not deal with is-
sues of investment or foreign ownership.'0 7 The OECD
Guidelines provide for national and most-favored-nation treat-
ment for investments made in member states.0 8 However,
failure to comply with its terms does not entitle other member
states to legal remedies.' 0 9 It is a political, not a legal, instru-
ment.11 0 Moreover, Canada has filed a reservation taking ex-
ception to the national treatment principle" t l under article III,
section 1 of the OECD Guidelines." t2  In effect, there is no
legally enforceable investment agreement between Canada
and the United States.
Both countries, however, have expressed interest in ex-
panding trade and investment negotiations within a multilat-
eral framework." 3 The current United States Administration,
for instance, would like to expand GATT to include trade in
services,"14 and hopes eventually, for an agreement similar to
GATT in the area of investments. 1 5 A United States proposal
for GATT expansion to trade in services suggests that a "trade
only" framework is not adequate." 6 Canadian officials are re-
ceptive to trade discussions at the multilateral level as well,
preferring such arrangements to a bilateral "elephant-mouse"
relationship with the United States. 1 7 As for investment, Can-
ada is satisfied with the present status quo and expresses no
106. STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 23.
107. Macdonald, supra note 6, at 403.
108. OECD Guidelines, supra notes 36, art. 2. For the principle provision, see
supra note 36.
109. Macdonald, supra note 6, at 399.
110. Id.
111. This principle calls for equal treatment in the taxation of foreign and do-
mestic products. See id.; see also GATT, supra note 35, art. III.
112. Macdonald, supra note 6, at 398-99. Under Canada's reservation, it "re-
tains its right to take measures affecting foreign investors which it considers to be
necessary in its particular circumstances." Can. Dep't of External Aff., Statement by
the Honourable Flora MacDonald at the OECD Ministerial Meeting (June 13, 1979).
113. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
114. R. GREY, supra note 39, at 74.
115. Interview with D.J. Klock, Financial Attache of the Embassy of the United
States of America, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 21, 1984). According to one United
States embassy official in Ottawa, investment and trade are inseparable. Id.
116. Id.
117. Interview with G.H. Dewhirst, Director General of the Foreign Investment
Review Agency, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
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interest in concluding an investment agreement at either the
bilateral or multilateral level with the United States. 118
B. Bilateral Agreements
While Canada and the United States do not have plans to
discuss an overall investment agreement," 9 both sides have
negotiated and are engaged in negotiations involving limited
free trade on a sectoral basis. 120 Although the United States
would prefer a master design for a comprehensive economic
arrangement, Canada favors an incremental and sectoral
scheme under which the accord would be slowly implemented
with a high degree of interim safeguard provisions.'
2
'
There is, however, considerable debate as to whether
sectoral arrangements should be extended to all industrial sec-
tors. 1 22  Critics voice several observations. First, both sides
perceive sectoral agreements differently: to the United States,
sectoral agreements are limited free trade agreements; 21 to
Canada, they are fair share arrangements. 124  The United
States, in its antipathy for market sharing agreements, does not
look favorably on Canadian safeguard provisions. 25 Another
problem is the incapacity of the United States Administration
to negotiate with major interest groups on trade policy.' 26
Further, the growing demand for protectionism in the United
States raises the question of whether a formalized bilateral eco-
nomic arrangement is feasible. 127 Finally, sectoral free trade
118. Interview with D. Waddell, Canadian Director of United States Trade and
Economic Relations, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
119. Id.
120. Anderson, Sectoral Free-Trade Pacts Offer Mutual Advantages, Globe and Mail,
Feb. 28, 1984, at B2, col. 5.
121. Beigie & Stewart, supra note 99, at 21. One example of sectoral free trade
is the area of automobile products, where an integrated Canadian-United States mar-
ket was created by promoting trade in new automobiles and parts on a duty free
basis. Morrissy, supra note 47, at 350.
122. Morrissy, supra note 47, at 350.
123. Id. at 351. This means that the United States views them as a compromise
to full free trade with Canada. See id. at 350-51.
124. Id. at 351. Fair share arrangements mean that the arrangements are used
to protect key Canadian trade sectors which would otherwise be vulnerable to un-
restricted competition from the United States. See id. at 350-51.
125. Beige & Stewart, supra note 99, at 21.
126. Id. at 21-22. "The increasing role of a fractious congress in trade policy
.. . leads to serious doubt about the bilateral negotiating process." Id. at 22.
127. Id. at 22.
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fails to create the institutional network necessary to "link" the
128two countries.
While most Canadian economists would probably favor a
general free trade arrangement with the United States, the
Canadian Government's opinion is that Canadians are not
ready for such a move. There is a fear that free trade would
lead to Canada's political subordination to the United
States.129 Sectoral arrangements avoid the political problems
raised by a comprehensive agreement while being consistent
with a policy of gradually moving toward free trade.13 0 Pres-
ently, a bilateral study group is studying prospects for liberaliz-
ing trade in steel, agricultural equipment, computer and infor-
mation services, and government procurement relating partic-
ularly to mass transit vehicles.'
3
'
III. ALTERNATIVES AND PROPOSALS
A. Why Free Trade and Open Access Investment?
In view of the current obstacles to trade and investment
between Canada and the United States, both countries have
studied the idea of creating a mutually acceptable framework
to conduct either trade or investment relations. The Canadian
Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs suggested in a
March, 1982 report that Canadian economic development
would be advanced through the conclusion of a comprehensive
free trade agreement between the two countries. 32 This sub-
ject has also been raised by the United States, most notably in
the United States Trade Agreements Act of 1979,13 3 which re-
128. Morrissy, supra note 47, at 353. "[T]here is a conspicuous absence of a
mutually accepted perception of the relationships among the North American coun-
tries. The old 'special' relationships between the United States and each of its neigh-
bors no longer provides policy guidance and support to bilateral consultations." Id.
129. Anderson, Sectoral Free-Trade Pacts Offer Mutual Advantages, Globe and Mail,
Feb. 28, 1984, at B2, col. 5. One Canadian business leader stated that while "sectoral
arrangements are the second-best solution to Canada's trade problems . . . it is more
practical than a genral free-trade approach." Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See STANDING COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 22. "The Committee
believes that if Canada is to retain its current standard of living and its present pro-
ductive capacity into the 1990's, the piecemeal approach to trade liberalizaon and the
reliance on a series of supportive measures must give way to the forthright adoption
of this broad policy initiative." Id.
133. 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982). This Act is designed to "approve and implement
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quired the President to report to Congress by mid-1981 on the
possibility of free trade agreements with countries of the
northern portion of the Western Hemisphere. 134 While Can-
ada does not share the United States' desire to conclude a bi-
lateral or multilateral investment agreement, 35 Canadian pol-
icy makers acknowledge the need to create national policies
that will address United States interests and sensitivities.
136
Most opposition to a bilateral free trade agreement be-
tween Canada and the United States comes from Canada.
137
Canadian opponents argue that adjustment costs would out-
weigh any short-term advantage, and that longer term gains
for Canada forecast by international trade theory would not be
realized in a Canadian-United States context. 3 8 They offer the
following reasons: 1) Canadian manufacturing industries en-
joy few comparative advantages vis-a-vis the United States; 139
2) Heavy United States ownership in Canadian industry would
tend to result in Canadian production being relocated in the
United States even where Canadian production costs were
lower;' 40 3) The exchange rate cannot be relied upon to regu-
late the relative competitiveness and location advantages
between Canada and the United States in the manufacturing
sector;' 4 ' and 4) The structure of the Canadian economy fol-
lowing free trade would be less conducive to its future devel-
opment. 42 In addition to these factors, many Canadians fear
the trade agreements negotiated under the Trade Act of 1974," 19 U.S.C. § 2101.
Id. § 2502.
134. Id. § 2511; see CAN. DEP'T OF EXTERNAL AFF., CANADIAN TRADE POLICY FOR
THE 1980's: A DISCUSSION PAPER 42 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN TRADE
POLICY].
135. Interview with D. Waddell, Canadian Director of United States Trade and
Economic Relations, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
136. See CANADIAN TRADE POLICY, supra note 134, at 42.
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id.
139. Id. "Consequently, the removal of tariffs would simply lead to the replace-
ment .. .of Canadian manufacturing production by Americans. Canadian labour
. . .would be drawn into the resources and services sector, would seek to emigrate
or, most probably, would swell the ranks of the unemployed." Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. "A strengthening of the resource sector at the expense of manufactur-
ing might yield high income but would stultify efforts to foster the indigenous tech-
nology and [research and developoment] capability necessary for Canada's longer
term success an industrial society." Id.
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that a Canadian-United States free trade agreement would,
over time, erode Canada's political sovereignty. 14' Free trade,
they assert, would inevitably lead to the formation of common
institutions, and, given relative economic weight, the United
States would tend to dominate these institutions. 44
However, proponents of bilateral free trade in Canada
note that the Canadian economy is already closely integrated
with that of the United States. 145 Interdependence, they argue,
is likely to increase in the future and may result in Canada's
economy becoming even more vulnerable to policies of the
United States.' 46 They believe that a free trade agreement is
necessary to reduce this danger and cite the following advan-
tages: 1) Much of Canadian manufacturing industry is not
competitive internationally, having developed behind a protec-
tive tariff;147 2) The United States is Canada's natural market
for manufactured goods;' 48 and 3) The dislocation costs of
free trade would be reduced by phasing in tariff reductions
over an extended period. 49
There are persuasive reasons for a United States interest
in a bilateral free trade agreement with Canada as well. First,
an administration study, authorized by the United States Trade
Agreement Act of 1974,150 found that the United States would
benefit from reciprocal trade liberalization with its North
American neighbors.' 5' Second, a convincing argument can
143. Id. at 43-44
144. Id. The Canadian Department of External Affairs concluded that there is
no convincing need to pursue a free trade agreement. Id. at 44.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 43. "Greater efficiency can be achieved through rationalization but
the domestic market alone is too small to allow for such rationalization and the reali-
zation of available economies of scale." Id.
148. Id. It is also a natural market for many resources and agricultural items.
"Free trade between Canada and United States would provide a large enough market
and a necessary competetive stimulus for Canadian industry .... "
149. Id. "It may not be necessary to include agricultural items in a free trade
arrangement. The floating exchange rate would tend to cushion the adverse short-
term impact of free trade on the Canadian manufacturing sector and to reduce the
risk of a major bilateral balance of payments deficit for Canada." Id.
150. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1982).
151. STANDING COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 39.
The report itself spoke of the 'clear economic arguments [favoring] regional
integration. It stated that U.S. industries might have 'fewer reservations
about trade liberalization with Canada due to a more comparable level of
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be made that the current trade "status quo" will only worsen
unless positive action is taken to promote effective and harmo-
nious bilateral trade relations. 152 Without the stabilizing factor
of ongoing multilateral trade negotiations to provide a forum
for dialogue, trade disputes between the two nations will tend
to erupt more easily.' 5 ' Third, there are commercial incen-
tives for the United States to enter into such an agreement:
guaranteed access to what is currently the most important sin-
gle market for United States firms; 154 benefits to industry in
emerging businesses and intra-industry trade; 55 advantage
over sectoral arrangements insofar as broader negotiations
permit trade-offs among sectors and among problems; 56 and
advancing the regional interests of both states.' 57 Finally, be-
cause Canada is the United States' major trading partner, it is
in the interest of the United States that Canada have a strong
economy. 158
Despite Canada's satisfaction with investment "status-
quo,""'15 compelling arguments exist for liberalization of in-
vestment restrictions as well. In a recent statement prepared
by the Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Eco-
economic development' than with Mexico which could be seen as threaten-
ingjobs and markets with cheaper goods. . . .[G]iven the Reagan Adminis-
tration's known advocacy of freer trade . . . any proposal for bilateral free
trade by Canada would likely be given fair hearing in Washington.
Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 40.
154. S. Weintraub, U.S.-Canada Free Trade: What's in it for the United States?
21 (Sept. 7, 1983) (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the Biennial Confer-
ence of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Rockport, Maine,
Sept. 29 to Oct. 1, 1983).
155. Id. at 21-22.
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. at 23.
158. STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 41. The Committe ex-
plained that:
The motive for the United States being willing to negotiate away some of
the problems is the motive to which we have often appealed in the United
States; that is their interest in Canada having a strong economy. . . .[T]hey
understand that they are not going to better themselves by weakening us
since we are their principal customer. Senior American policy-makers do
adjust their policy in the light of that requirement.
Id.
159. See Interview with D. Waddell, Canadian Director of United States Trade
and Economic Relations, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
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nomic Policy, President Reagan stated that in order to achieve
more efficient international production, "foreign investment
flows must respond to private market forces."' 16 According to
the policy statement, direct private foreign investment plays a
vital role in the United States and world economies because it
"can act as a catalyst for growth, introduce new technology and
management skills, expand employment and improve produc-
tivity. Foreign direct investment can be an important source of
capital and can stimulate international trade. Both home and
host country economies benefit from an open international in-
vestment system."'' 6 1
In view of growing intervention by both developing and
developed nations attempting to regulate international direct
investment, the United States is advocating free, unimpeded
international investment at both the multilateral and bilateral
levels.' 62 Should the United States conclude a comprehensive
bilateral agreement with Canada, it would probably emphasize
the free flow of investment.1
6 3
B. A Proposed Legal Framework
This section explores both the nature of a free trade and
open access investment agreement and the types of provisions
likely to be included in such an agreement.
1. Proposed Trade Section to a Bilateral Agreement
a. A Bilateral Agreement and GATT
Any free trade agreement between Canada and the United
States must stay within the legal framework of the GATT arti-
cles.' 64 The basic principle behind the GATT is nondiscrimi-
nation, i.e., members shall extend to all other members, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, any concessions negotiated on both
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade.' 65 Article XXIV of GATIT,
160. International Investment Policy, Statement by President, 19 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1214, 1214 (Sept. 9, 1983).
161. Id. at 1217.
162. Id. at 1216-19.
163. STANDING COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 45.
164. Id. at 30. "Any other course would be likely to invite retaliation from third
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however, permits signatories to negotiate preferential free
trade agreements so long as certain conditions are met. 166 Re-
alistically, there are two possible avenues Canada and the
United States could pursue to negotiate a free trade arrange-
ment within the legal framework of article XXIV of GATT:
either a declaratory approach or conclusion of an interim
agreement.
Under a declaratory approach, article XXIV requires that
all barriers to trade be eliminated on substantially all trade of
goods between the countries concluding a preferential agree-
ment. 67 If such a requirement is met, Canada and the United
States would issue a bilateral declaration of free trade as ex-
isting between the two countries. 68 From there they would be
free to liberalize trade for further products as they see fit.' 69
However, although the declaratory approach would clear the
way for duty free trade in the remaining fifteen or twenty per-
cent of protected industries, its main deficiency is that it ig-
nores the problem of nontariff barriers. 7
0
The second possibility within article XXIV is a Canadian-
United States interim agreement leading to the formation of a
free trade area. Under this alternative, the countries involved
submit a plan and schedule for the achievement of a free trade
area within a reasonable length of time to GA"TT signatories,
as well as adequate information to allow them to make recom-
mendations. 17  The central advantage to this approach is that
it provides a mechanism for negotiating the mutual reduction
of nontariff barriers. 72 Canada and the United States, regard-
166. GATT, supra note 35, art. XXIV; see STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 79, at 30.
167. GATT, supra note 35, art. XXIV.
168. STANDING COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 32.
169. Id. The Canadian Senate Standing Committee concluded that "by 1987 a
defacto free trade area between Canada and the United States could be deemed to
exist in respect to tariffs." Id. at 33.
170. Id. These include the valuation of countervailing duties, customs and an-
tidumping procedures. Id.
171. Id. at 34.
172. Id. The Senate Committee, in recommending this approach, states:
The main advantage of the "interim agreement" procedure is the opportu-
nity it offers, before initial negotiations have been completed, to ascertain
the degree of commitment on the part of the United States to reduce ...
some of its non-tariff barriers. . . .In effect . . . each side could test the
other's position before ratifying a treaty. ...
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less of the approach, could, in all likelihood, conclude a free
trade agreement within the legal parameters of GATT.
b. General Considerations Regarding the Nature of a Free
Trade Agreement
In its report on Canadian-United States Trade Relations,
the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs
concluded that the only successful approach under an interim
agreement would be a comprehensive across-the-board trade
arrangement. 173  It further concluded that such an accord
should set out a schedule of tariff reductions over a given tran-
sition period, with particularly sensitive items negotiated as ex-
clusions, rather than excluding everything unless specifically
negotiated.174 The committee did not attempt to specify in de-
tail provisions that should be included in a Canadian-United
States free trade agreement, because it believed that such a
task was better left to negotiation. 175 The committee did out-
line some general observations on the terms such an agree-
ment should contain.
i. Timing and Scope
The committee recommended that nontariff barriers be
eliminated immediately, and tariffs be eliminated over a transi-
tion period of eight to ten years. Further, it recommended an
increased rate of elimination of United States tariffs to enable a
major reorganization of Canadian industry. 76 This is not the
case for United States industry, because United States barriers
are less extensive to begin with. 17 7
ii. Rules of Origin
A free trade area between Canada and the United States
raised the problem of "trade deflection." ' 78 This occurs when
products from third countries enter the free trade area by way
Id. at 35.
173. Id. at 36.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 89.
176. Id. at 90.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 91.
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of the country with the lowest tariff on that particular good. 79
The product is then reexported to the other member of the
free trade area at a zero tariff rate, thereby providing an unfair
benefit to the country with the lower external tariff. For this
reason, a free trade agreement must establish "rules of origin"
for intramember trade.180 The committee concluded that rules
of origin should be liberal enough for Canadian manufacturers
to continue to receive less costly imports. 18
iii. Exceptions and Safeguards
The committee concluded that agricultural products
would be the most important exception in a Canadian-United
States agreement. It believed that each country should retain
sovereignty over matters relating to customs administration
and to the imposition of their individual tariffs against third
party states.' 82  Furthermore, it found that escape clauses
could be used by member states faced with disruptions in par-
ticular sectors, resulting from tariff cuts designed to impose
quantitative limitations, provided that rigid standards are
met.'8 3 In addition, it might be politically necessary to include
guarantees for Canadian employment so long as they are sub-
ject to a rigid, short-term transitional time period. 84
iv. Adjustment Assistance
The committee also found that most of the burden of ad-
justment resulting from a Canadian-United States free trade
agreement would fall on Canada. 18 5 This is because the impact
of United States competition on Canadian industry would be
much greater than the impact of Canadian competition on
United States industry. 8 6 The committee, therefore, was of
the opinion that a well planned program of adjustment assist-
ance to affected industries would be an essential aspect of a
179. Id.
180. Id.




185. Id. at 94.
186. Id.
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Canadian-United States free trade agreement.187
v. Subsidies
The committee recommended that a free trade agreement
between Canada and the United States include an explicit un-
derstanding of "a balance of mutually tolerable subsidy pro-
grams."1 88 These would meet each state's needs without un-
duly frustrating the objectives of the agreement itself.189
vi. Competition Policy
Rationalization through mergers of small Canadian pro-
ducers, as well as the rationalization of United States firms with
Canadian subsidiaries, should be encouraged.' 9 0 In order to
enhance such a process, the committee suggested that a free
trade agreement provide that United States and Canadian
competition laws be relaxed during the transition period.' 9'
vii. The Institutional Structure
Finally, the committee found that a permanent joint mech-
anism to monitor the performance of a bilateral free trade
agreement would be required.' 92 In addition, it would be im-
portant to create an appeal tribunal to rule on complaints and
violations under the free trade agreement.' 93
C. The Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations-Trade
Agreement as a Model
This section examines the Australia-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations-Trade Agreement' 94 (Australia New Zea-
187. Id. at 96.
188. Id. at 98.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 99.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 106.
194. Mar. 28, 1982, Australia-New Zealand, 22 I.L.M. 945 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Australia-New Zealand Agreement]. The objectives of the treaty are:
(a) to strengthen the broader relationship between Australia and New
Zealand;
(b) to develop closer economic relations between the Member States
through a mutually beneficial expansion of free trade between New
Zealand and Australia;
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land Trade Agreement) as a possible model for a bilateral free
trade agreement between Canada and the United States. The
desirability of this model is twofold. First, the relationship be-
tween Australia and New Zealand is remarkably similar to the
one between Canada and the United States. 195 Second, the
provisions of the Australian New Zealand Trade Agreement
seem to fit squarely within the recommendations of the Stand-
ing Senate Committee and the needs of Canada and the United
States in their trade relationship.1 96
1. Parallels
The economic relationship between Australia and New
Zealand parallels the Canadian-United States situation.1 97 Like
Canada and the United States, Australia and New Zealand have
developed a close economic relationship, and their citizens
tend to think of themselves as part of the same culture. Not
only do they share a common language, historical origin and
geography, but they are also each other's major trading and
investment partners.' 98 Moreover, New Zealand, with a popu-
lation one-fifth the size of Australia's, expressed the same re-
luctance Canada now expresses about entering into a free
trade agreement with its larger neighbor. 9 9 New Zealand
feared such a move would diminish its ability to safeguard long
sheltered industries. 20 0 Both nations recognized that the New
Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement, 20  a product-by-
product free trade approach similar in concept to sectoral free
trade between Canada and the United States, was far too re-
(c) to eliminate barriers to trade between Australia and New Zealand in a
gradual and progressive manner under an agreed timetable and with
minimum of disruption; and
(d) to develop trade between New Zealand and Australia under conditions
of fair competition.
Id. art. 1.
195. Interview with T.H. Gross, Commercial Counsellor, Australian High Com-
mission, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984); see infra notes 197-206 and accompany-
ing text.
196. See supra notes 173-93 and accompanying text.
197. Interview with T.H. Gross, Commercial Counsellor, Australian High Com-




201. Aug. 31, 1965, Australia-New Zealand, 5 I.L.M. 305 (1966).
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strictive.2 °2 In an effort to develop closer economic relations,
eliminate barriers to trade between the two countries in a grad-
ual and progressive manner, and conduct trade under condi-
tions of fair competition, the Australia-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations-Trade Agreement was concluded. 20 3 The
agreement, which complies with article XXIV of GATT,20 4 is a
comprehensive free trade arrangement that takes into account
relevant regional factors.2 0 5 New Zealand, for example, is given
special treatment in some industry sectors that it believes are
still vulnerable and require continued protection. 0 6 Clearly,
this similarity appears to make the Australia New Zealand
Trade Agreement an appropriate model for Canadian-United
States trade relations.
2. Relevant Provisions
The Australia New Zealand Trade Agreement is compre-
hensive and includes types of provisions recommended by the
Standing Senate Committee. Among areas directly recom-
mended by the committee that the agreement covers are: tar-
iffs, 2 0 7 nontariff barriers, such as antidumping action,20 8 coun-
tervailing action, 0 9 safeguard measures during the transition
period,2 10 and government purchasing. 211 It also covers ex-
port subsidies and incentives, 21 2 rules of origin, 213 agricultural
stabilization and support,21 4 and consultation and review.21 5
Other provisions in the agreement would also be suitable
202. Interview with T.H. Gross, Commercial Counsellor, Australian High Com-
mission, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
203. Australia-New Zealand Agreement, supra note 194, art. 1.
204. GAIT, supra note 35, art. XXIV
205. See Interview with T.H. Gross, Commercial Counsellor, Australian High
Commission, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
206. See Australia-New Zealand Agreement, supra note 194, annex. C.
207. See id. art. 4.
208. See id art. 15.
209. See id. art. 16.
210. See id. art. 17.
211. See id. art. 11.
212. See id. art. 9.
213. See id. art. 3.
214. See id. art. 10.
215. See id. art. 22. This article calls for annual meetings between ministers of
member states, and meetings at the written request of either nation when one state
believes that an obligation has not been fulfilled, a benefit conferred upon it by the
agreement is being denied, the achievement of any objective of the agreement is
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for a Canadian-United States agreement. Article 12, for in-
stance, covers "Other Trade Distorting Factors" and provides
that member states shall "examine the scope for taking action
to harmonise requirements relating to such matters as stan-
dards, technical specifications and testing procedures, domes-
tic labelling and restrictive trade practices. 21 6 Such a stipula-
tion in a Canadian-United States context would be of tremen-
dous help to United States manufacturers who must comply
with Canadian federal legislation requiring product labelling in
both French and English. 2 7  The agreement, furthermore,
provides for harmonization of customs policies and procedures
in particular cases by requiring each member state to consult at
the written request of the other.218 Article 18 contains a list of
exceptions that cover areas such as general health, morals, and
welfare,21 9 while article 6 and annexes C, E, and F refer to
those sectors in which the agreement has modified application,
such as agricultural and other food products (e.g. tobacco,
plastics, textiles, wood, and certain iron and steel products).220
3. Proposed Investment Section to a Bilateral Agreement
An open access investment agreement between Canada
and the United States must be based on principles of national
being frustrated, or "a case of difficulty has arisen or may arise." Id. A general re-
view of the operation of the agreement will occur in 1988, based on such factors as:
(a) whether the agreement is bringing benefits to Australia and New Zea-
land on a reasonably equitable basis having regard to factors such as
the impact on trade...
(b) the need for additional measures ...
(c) the need for changes in Government economic policies and practices
(d) such modification of the operation of this Agreement as may be neces-
sary to ensure that quantitative import restrictions and tariff quotas
* * * are eliminated by 30 June, 1995; and ...
(e) any other matter relating to this Agreement.
Id.
216. Id. art. 12.
217. See, e.g., Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, ch. 41, 1970-1972 Can.
Stat. 831; Textile Labelling Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 46 (1st Supp. 1970); Food and
Drugs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-27 (1970); Canada Agricultural Products Standards
Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-8 (1970); Fish Inspection Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-12
(1970); Meat Inspection Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. M-7 (1970); Hazardous Products
Act, ch. 42, 1968-1969 Can. Stat. 997.
218. Australia-New Zealand Agreement, supra note 194, art. 21.
219. Id. art. 18.
220. Id. art. 6, annexes C, E & F.
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treatment, most-favored-nation and right of establishment. 221
For this reason, the terms of Canada's FIRA must be faced. 222
One proposal would permit the screening agency to continue
through the transition period in order to protect small, dislo-
cated Canadian firms dependent on the Canadian domestic
market and faced with the need to restructure.2 23 Once Cana-
dian industry sufficiently rationalizes to be competitive, FIRA's
importance as a screening agency would decline.224 Such an
alternative would make an investment treaty with Canada polit-
ically more feasible.225 However, it is clear that, from a United
States perspective, any agreement must eventually lead to full,
free, and open access to investment between the two states.2 2 6
The following are the types of provisions such an agreement
would be likely to include.
a. National Treatment and the Right of Establishment
Foreign investors should be able to make the same kinds
of investments, under the same conditions, as nationals of the
host state.227 Exceptions should be limited to areas of legiti-
mate national security or related interests.2 28 In such in-
stances, investments should be treated in accordance with the
most-favored-nation principle. 229 In addition, there should be
no unreasonable or discriminatory barriers to establish-
ment.23 0
b. Compensation for Expropriation
The Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investments, 23 1 between the United States
221. See International Investment Policy, Statement by the President, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214, 1216-17 (Sept. 9, 1983).
222. STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 85.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Interview with D.H. Wright, Senior Associate, Business Council on Na-
tional Issues, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
226. See International Investment Policy, Statement by President, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214, 1216 (Sept. 9, 1983).
227. Id. at 1216.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1216-17.
231. Sept. 29, 1982, Egypt-United States, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 927 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Egypt Treaty]. This treaty was opposed by Egypt, partly because the
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and Egypt, provides an appropriate model for an expropria-
tion compensation provision in the Canadian-United States
context. Such a provision should provide that no investment
may be expropriated unless the taking is done for a public pur-
pose; is accomplished under due process of law; is not discrim-
inatory; is accompanied by prompt and adequate compensa-
tion; and does not violate any agreement regarding contractual
stability or expropriation.232 Compensation must equal the
fair market value of the expropriated investment on the date of
expropriation.23 3 Such compensation must be calculated not
to reflect any reduction in fair market value due to either prior
public notice or the occurrence of the events that constituted
or resulted in the expropriatory action.234
c. Consultation and Exchange of Information
The parties should, on written request of either one, hold
prompt consultations to discuss the interpretation or applica-
tion of the agreement or to resolve any disputes in connection
with it.235
d. Proposed Dispute Resolution Mechanism
In order to resolve disputes arising under a free trade and
investment agreement between Canada and the United States,
some type of legally enforceable dispute resolution mechanism
is required. Canada is not a signatory to the Treaty on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
expropriation provisions conflicted with third world views, and is being renegotiated.
Note, An Examination of Compensation Terms in the United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment
Treaty, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287, 301 (1984).
232. Egypt Treaty, supra note 231, art. 3.
233. Id.
234. Id. The United States Egyptian treaty provides that "such compensation
shall include payments for delay as may be considered appropriate under interna-
tional law, and shall be freely transferable at the prevailing rate of exchange for cur-
rent transactions on the date of the expropriatory action." Id.
A new series of United States investment treaties, such as the Egypt Treaty
under consideration here, has changed the customary prompt, adequate and effective
compensation standard the above definition. Compare id. with Treaty of Amity, Eco-
nomic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. IV(2), 8
U.S.T. 899, 903, T.I.A.S. No. 3853. These new terms appear to require fair market
value compensation and clear up possible ambiguities associated with the traditional
terms. See Note, supra note 231, at 292.
235. See Note, supra note 231, at 300.
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als of Other States.236 Thus, arbitration, the traditional treaty
dispute resolution mechanism, does not exist as a readily avail-
able alternative. Diplomacy remains as the only procedure to
resolve disputes. For this reason, both Canada and the United
States should adopt procedures recommended by a joint work-
ing group of the American Bar Association and Canadian Bar
Association for a system of third-party settlement of legal dis-
putes. 23 7 The draft treaty, which is designed for the legal back-
grounds of jCanada and the United States, is composed of a
mechanism to which both countries could submit disputes aris-
ing out of "any question of interpretation, application or oper-
ation of a treaty in force between them. '238 When a dispute
arises, it would be submitted to a three member arbitral tribu-
nal, one from each member state with the third selected by
agreement of the two states. 23 9 Where nations are unable to
agree on the choice of a third arbitrator within 120 days, the
matter would be referred to a special chamber of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.240 Compulsory arbitration would be
available if all efforts at negotiation failed.24 ' InJanuary, 1984,
a similar dispute resolution mechanism was introduced by Sen-
ator Mitchell into the United States Senate.242
IV. OUTLOOK AND SUMMARY
In a recent article, Canada's national newspaper reported
that Canada is now pursuing a policy of free trade with the
United States. 243 According to the report, some high-ranking
Canadian officials even favor full bilateral free trade with the
United States.
Sylvia Ostry, deputy minister of international trade, places
236. Opened for signature Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 160.
237. Am. Bar Ass'n & Can. Bar Ass'n, Draft Treaty on a Third-Party Settlement of
Disputes, in SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BETWEEN CANADA AND THE
U.S.A. xxi (1979).
238. Id. art. 1.
239. Id. art. 3.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 1.
242. S. 2228, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 62 (1984).
243. Free Trade Backers Predict Economics of Scale, Globe and Mail, Mar. 16, 1984, at
1, col. 3.
1985]
192 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:161
great store in free-trade arrangements. She does not think
free trade would impinge on national sovereignty.
"Look at Europe," she insists. "The countries are as na-
tionalistic as ever. Look at Canada. Ask yourself: is Canada
now more linked to the U.S. economically than it was in
1950? The answer is yes. But has that diminished Canada's
sense as a nation? The answer is no." 244
Prominent members of Canada's business community appear
to be in agreement. 245 Pierre Lortie, president of the Montreal
Stock Exchange, is quoted as saying "[we] should aim at total
integration. . . . Our governments may lose some of their dis-
cretionary powers but Canada as a whole will gain. The time
has come to seriously consider the North American option.- 246
The Reagan Administration welcomes Canada's overture to
liberalize trade.247 According to one official, the United States
is "essentially following the Canadian Government's lead. ' 248
Investment, unlike trade, is not an area Canada is seeking
to liberalize.249 One official in the United States State Depart-
ment noted that overall the Canadian-United States relation-
ship is "in good shape, ' 250 and that Canadian administration
of FIRA has improved.25'
CONCLUSION
Although Canada and the United States are each others'
major trading partners, they have not concluded a comprehen-
sive trade agreement to resolve disputes or protect trade be-
tween the two nations. A comprehensive, bilateral, free trade,
open access investment agreement between Canada and the
United States, similar to the Australia-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations Trade Agreement, would facilitate trade
244. Id. at 14, col. 2.
245. Id. col. 6.
246. Id.
247. King, Reagan Aide Welcomes Overture, Globe and Mail, Mar. 16, 1984, at 14,
col. 3.
248. Id. col. 4.
249. Interview with D. Waddell, Canadian Director of United States Trade and
Economic Relations, in Ottawa, Canada (Feb. 20, 1984).
250. Martin, U.S. Awaits Overtures on Free Trade Pacts, Globe and Mail, Mar. 20,
1984, at 4, col. 5.
251. Id. col. 6. This is demonstrated by increased satisfaction on the part of
United States companies with how their proposals are handled. Id.
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and investment between the United States and Canada, while
providing adequate protection to those industries that may be
threatened by foreign competition.
